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Abstract. In this work we deploy a mechanism design approach for
allocating a divisible commodity (electricity in our example) among con-
sumers. We consider each consumer with an associated personal valua-
tion function of the energy resource during a certain time interval. We
aim to select the optimal consumption profile for every user avoiding
consumption peaks when the total required energy could exceed the en-
ergy production. The mechanism will be able to drive users in shifting
energy consumptions in different hours of the day. We start by presenting
a very basic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, we discuss its weakness
and propose several more complex variants.
1 Introduction
In this work, we investigate the trade-off between a final user’s point of view
and a distributor’s one when dealing with divisible commodities. We use a game
theoretic approach and illustrate several mechanisms to guide the community
towards a responsible electricity usage. The model takes into account the pref-
erence consumption of every single user and at the same time avoids blackout
situations in which the overall consumption is greater than the actual available
energy.
Our main objective is to select the users’ consumption amount in order to op-
timize and not to waste the produced energy. This aim can be reached through
the modification of users’ energy consumption according to the produced energy.
The problem that the model faces, is know in literature as an energy manage-
ment problem, also know as demand side management (DSM) problem or also
divisible commodities allocation [5]. It could happen that the available energy
for a specific hour of the day is not sufficient to cover users’ needs. Instead of
providing a larger amount of energy, a distributor is interested into shifting the
consumption in the hours in which the overall consumption is much less than
the production.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Initially, Section 2 presents
the mechanism design background. Then, Section 3 explain he problem state-
ment as well as the definitions of the proposed mechanisms. In Section 4, we
expose and analyse related works, while we conclude with remarks and future
works in Section 5.
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2 Mechanism Design Approach for Energy Efficiency
2 Background
2.1 General concepts
Mechanism Design [7, 10, 11, 14] is based on the concept of social choice that
is simply an aggregation of the preferences of the different participants toward
a single collective decision. Mechanism Design attempts to implement desired
social choices in a strategic setting, assuming that players act rationally in a
game theoretic sense.
Definition 1 (Player’s Valuation Function) Let us consider a set of play-
ers N = {1, . . . , n} and a set of alternatives or outcomes A. Every player i has
a preference over alternatives that is described by a valuation function:
vi : A→ R
where vi(a) denotes the valuation that player i assigns to outcome a. Further-
more, vi ∈ Vi where Vi ⊆ R|A| is a set of possible valuation functions for player
i.
Definition 2 (Social Choice Function) The social choice function selects an
alternative (or outcome) from the set of alternatives A according to the vector
of users’ valuation functions:
f : V1 × · · · × Vn → A
So, an outcome a, from the set A of alternatives, depends on each possible profile
v = (v1, v2, . . . , vn) :
a = f(v)
This outcome is called social choice for that profile.
When considering a mechanism with money, that is a mechanism where there
are money transfers between the mechanism and players, a payment function
computes money transfers for every players.
Definition 3 (Direct Revelation Mechanism) A direct4 revelation mecha-
nism M is composed of:
M = 〈f, p1, . . . , pn〉
where f is the social choice function with A as the possible outcomes and p1, . . . , pn
are the payment vectors where pi : V1× · · · × . . . Vn → R is the amount that user
i pays to the mechanism.
4 There exists also the indirect revelation mechanism with money, that differs for the
fact that players have private information (player’s preferences) and select strategies
according to this information set. In this work, we do not consider indirect revelation
mechanism because we assume that the users’ valuations functions are known.
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Definition 4 (Utility Function) Considering a mechanismM = 〈f, p1, . . . , pn〉,
the valuation set v = (v1, . . . , vn) and the alternative chosen a = f(v1, . . . , vn),
the utility for every user i is:
ui(a) = vi(a)− pi(vi(a), v−i(a)) (1)
where v−i is the (n-1)-dimensional vector in which the i’th coordinate is removed.
Definition 5 (Truthfulness) A mechanism M is called truthful (also called
strategy-proof or incentive compatible) if for every agent i, every v1 ∈ V1, . . . , vn ∈
Vn and every v
′
i ∈ Vi where a = f(vi, v−i) and a′ = f(v′i, v−i) then:
ui(a) ≥ ui(a′) (2)
Here, the social choice function selects the outcome a if the player reports his real
valuation, at the contrary the social choice function selects the outcome a′ if the
player, trying to get a greater utility, reports a false valuation. In other words,
this means that an agent prefers to declare the “truth” to the mechanism rather
than any possible “lie”, because it gives him higher or at least equal utility.
Definition 6 (Individual Rationality) A mechanism is individually rational
if players always get non-negative utility. Formally if for every 〈v1, . . . , vn〉 we
have that:
vi(f(v1, . . . , vn))− pi(v1, . . . , vn) ≥ 0 (3)
Definition 7 (No Positive Transfer) A mechanism has no positive transfers
if no player receives money. Formally if for every v1, . . . , vn and for every i we
have that:
pi(v1, . . . , vn) ≥ 0 (4)
2.2 VCG Mechanism
The most famous direct revelation mechanism is the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
(VCG) Mechanism [11].
Definition 8 (VCG Mechanism) A VCG mechanism determines f(v):
f(v) ∈ argmaxb∈A
n∑
j=1
vj(b) (5)
and pi(v) such that:
pi(v) = hi(v−i)−
n∑
j 6=i
vj(f(v)) (6)
for some function h1, . . . , hn where hi : V−i → R.
Now, there are several versions of the model according to the choice of hi(v−i).
Important to note that the function hi can be any arbitrary function but it must
not depend on the vi. One of the most important versions is the VCG mechanism
with the Clarke pivot rule, introduced by Clarke [4].
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Definition 9 (VCG Mechanism with Clarke Pivot Rule) A VCG mech-
anism with Clarke pivot payments determines hi(vi):
hi(v−i) = maxa
n∑
j 6=i
vj(a) (7)
so pi(v) becomes:
pi(v) = maxb
n∑
j 6=i
vj(b)−
n∑
j 6=i
vj(f(v)) (8)
where b is the selected alternative if the i-th player is not present in the system5.
By choosing this kind of hi(v−i) Clarke wants to let the buyer paying only the
influence that he has in the system. In fact, an user influences the system when
the outcome changes depending on the absence or presence of player i. If the
outcome changes significantly when player i is removed, it means that player i
strongly affects the system, so he has to pay for his influence (from this concept
derives the name “Clarke pivot rule”).
Proposition 1 The VCG mechanism with Clarke pivot rule guaranties the prop-
erties of truthfulness, maximize social welfare, individual rationality and no pos-
itive transfer [2, 11].
3 Problem Formulation and System Model
3.1 Problem Description
In our work, we model an energy allocation problem through a VCG mechanism
approach. The main aim is to avoid blackouts when the users’ requested energy
exceeds the available energy and the energy network must be switched off due
to overload. Fig. 1 describes a possible case for one-day time period with trends
for the energy functions. The dashed line represents the distributor’s available
energy, the continuous line the energy requested from all consumers. The lines
on the bottom represent the single consumption of every user (five users in this
case). So in Fig. 1b, we can consider only the consumers ”players” and the en-
ergy available function as a parameter for the mechanism. The produced energy
is a constraint to take into account while maximizing the social welfare. Fig. 1a
describes an example of a situation in which energy availability function (dashed
line) and aggregate users’ consumption (continuous line) are compared. Where
the set of players contains the distributor and the difference between this two
functions (production - consumption, the dotted line in the graph) must be
5 Here, “a” is the optimal assignment including player “i”, while “b” is the optimal
assignment when we exclude player “i”
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(a) Trend of energy availability consider-
ing the energy distributor a player.
(b) Trend of energy availability consider-
ing only consumers as players
Fig. 1: Comparison between energy functions: users’ desired trends, the aggre-
gated desired trend of all of agent and the produced energy function.
greater or equal than zero. In fact, another way to tackle this problem is that we
can consider that the difference between the production and the aggregate con-
sumption, must be greater or equal than zero for this purpose we can consider
the distributor as a player. The main idea is to deploy a mechanism in order to
drive users in shifting energy consumptions, according to the produced energy
and the consumption preference of the community.
3.2 Model Description
Our objective is to determine a mechanism that will select the optimal energy
according to the desired consumption of every player.
3.2.1 Case 1 In our first mechanism we consider a scenario with an energy
distributor and n energy users (n + 1 players), assuming that the (n + 1)th
is the distributor, so the situation in Fig. 1b. We have two possible outcomes,
A = {0, 1}, the value 1 represents that the aggregated consumption is not greater
than the energy available P , the opposite for the value 0. Every player, except
the distributor, has a valuation over the set of alternatives A, vi : A → R we
define vi as:
vi(a) =
{
−xi if a = 1
0 if a = 0
where xi is the desired consumption of user i, assuming that the valuation is
directly correlated to the amount of consumed energy as described in [6]. The
negative value of the desired consumption is an artefact due to the design of
the social choice function and to the fact that we want to model also the energy
producer as a player. In the same way the energy distributor (n + 1th player)
has a valuation vn+1:
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vi(a) =
{
P if a = 1
0 if a = 0
where P is the produced energy. According to the VCG mechanism with pivot
rule, the social choice function f : V → {0, 1} is defined as:
f(v) = arg maxa∈A
n+1∑
j=1
vj(a) (9)
The f(v) will select a = 0 when overall consumption is greater than the produced
energy. Otherwise, the f(v) will select a = 1 if the overall consumption is less
or equal than the produced energy
∑n
j=1 vj(1) ≥ −vn+1(1). It is possible to
note that the mechanism presented guarantees no energy blackout situations,
where the produced energy is not sufficient to cover the consumption causing
the collapse of the electricity network.
As payment scheme we use the Clarke pivot rule (Eq. 8):
pi(v) = maxb∈A
n+1∑
j 6=i
vj(b)−
n+1∑
j 6=i
vj(f(v)) (10)
Considering a generic user i, we note that if a = 0 the energy is not provided
at all. Furthermore, if b = 0, it means that the consumption without user i is
greater than the production, user i has not to pay because he is not a pivot player.
However, considering Eq. 10 if a = 0 (the energy is not provided) and b = 1, it
means that if user i is not present in the community the overall consumption is
not greater that the produced energy and the energy would be provided. For this
reason, user i is pivotal, so he will pay an amount non-negative, corresponding to
the energy that would consume other users, even if he has not consumed energy,
because it is his fault if the energy is not provided. This, in a real situation,
will push user i to not require his allocated energy in order to avoid an heavy
charge (and the connected blackout situation). At the contrary if a = 1 the
only possible case is to have b = 1. In this case users are not pivotal and the
mechanism will not charge any additional fee. This mechanism has the positive
aspect that it avoids blackout situations. However, it has a relevant weak point.
If the aggregated consumption is greater than the production, the mechanism
will not provide energy to anyone even if there could be better solutions by
delivering energy only to non-pivot users.
3.2.2 Case 2 In the previous case, we have two alternatives: everyone or no
one consumes energy. This is not an efficient energy management mechanism,
because if the consumption is slightly higher than the production, no one is au-
thorized to consume and the whole produced energy is wasted. So, we propose
a slightly different mechanism. In this mechanism we have a set of possible out-
comes A ⊆ {0, 1}n where the value a[i] = 0 represents that the specific user i
does not consume, the opposite for the value a[i] = 1 if the user consumes. As
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described in Fig. 1a, we consider the consumption of every consumer without the
energy distributor but with a threshold value represented by the amount of pro-
duced energy. Indeed, we consider the available energy function as a parameter
that influences the possible outcome. In fact, we do not consider all the possible
elements of the vector A ⊆ {0, 1}n but A = {a : ∑nj xj · a[j] ≤ P}, where P is
the energy available and xi is the desired consumption of player i. In this case,
every user has the valuation function vi(a) = xi · a[i] (same to Case 1 in 3.2.1).
Suppose that the total users’ consumption is less or equal than produced en-
ergy, we have that the social choice function will select the outcome maximizing
the sum of valuations. So, the selected alternative is a = (1, . . . , 1) with no pivot
users. In the opposite case, if the consumption is greater than the production, the
social choice function selects the alternative a that maximizes the allowed con-
sumption under the production constraint. In other words, it selects to provide
energy to a subset of users, according to their optimal consumption, avoiding the
energy wasting. Again, considering user i, if a[j] = b[j] in Eq.10 for every j 6= i,
the outcome is not influenced by user i and his payment remains zero. But, if
a[j] 6= b[j] for some j 6= i, it means that without user i the f(v) will choose the
consumption of other users in K instead of i, with vi(a) ≥
∑
j∈K vj(a). Thanks
to this modification, the mechanism presented in this case offers a more efficient
energy usage respect to the case in Section 3.2.1 because here the social choice
function can select the maximum number of user that are allowed to consume. In
the first case, we had two possibility, provide energy to everyone or not provide
energy at all. For this reason, the mechanism could waste all the energy pro-
duced. In this second case, the energy is provided only to a subset of users with
aim to avoiding the waste of produced energy. It is still possible to minimize the
amount of energy wasted, thanks to a larger set of alternatives A described in
the next case.
3.2.3 Case 3 In this third case, we propose a mechanism that assigns to users
all the available energy till reaching the total amount of produced energy.
Considering a scenario with n players, we have always a set of possible outcomes
A ⊆ [0, xi]n where xi is the desired consumption of user i. As in the case in
Section 3.2.2, we do not consider all the possible elements of A but A = {a :∑n
j a[j] ≤ P} and P is the energy available. In this way, the distributor can
provide an arbitrary amount of energy to user i where the maximum xi is the
i’s optimal consumption. The valuation function of user i is: vi(a) = a[i].
Still assuming that “a” is the optimal assignment (outcome selected by the social
choice function) including player “i”, while “b” is the optimal assignment when
we exclude player “i”, if a 6= b it means that a[i] ∈ (0, xi] and without user i the
f(v) will choose the consumption (or assigns a higher consumption) of another
user k instead of i, resulting that vi(a) ≥ vk(a). For this reason the payment of
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user i is non-negative:
pi(v) =
n∑
j 6=i
vj(b)−
n∑
j 6=i
vj(a) ≥ 0 (11)
The utility of user i will be:
ui(v) = vi(a)− pi(v) ≥ 0 (12)
In this case, we can distinguish two cases. Let Ctot =
∑
i 6=j xj (the sum of all
requests of all users except user i).
1. if Ctot ≥ P , then pi = a[i] meaning that a user i will pay his consumed
energy. In fact we have that pi =
∑
vj(b) −
∑
vj(a) where
∑
vj(b) = P ,
while
∑
vj(a) = P − a[i];
2. if Ctot < P , then pi = Ctot−(P−a[i]), because again pi =
∑
vj(b)−
∑
vj(a),
but here
∑
vj(b) = Ctot. This means that pi can be 0 also if a[i] = P −Ctot,
which can be > 0.
It is important to note that every user i will receive an amount of energy not
greater than xi because of the constraint: a[i] ∈ [0, xi].
This mechanism has several properties:
– the whole produced energy is used. Indeed, the social choice function selects
an outcome a which has the property:
∑n
i a[i] = P . This is an optimal
solution because there is no waste of energy;
– the mechanism has an infinite set of possible solutions (choices of a), all
those that satisfy the production threshold;
– as in the case in Section 3.2.2, every player will get in every case a non-
negative utility.
The models analysed so far consider only one slice of time. A natural improve-
ment in the next case is the insertion of the concept of time.
3.2.4 Case 4 We start from the mechanism described in Section 3.2.2. But,
the main difference is that in this fourth case we take into account also the time
t. Formally, we introduce a time variable: t ∈ [0, T ], where T is the maximum
length.
Considering a scenario with n players, we have that a possible outcome is a =
(a1(t), . . . , an(t)) where ai(t) ∈ R+ for every t ∈ [0, T ] and where xi : [0, T ]→ R
is the desired consumption function of user i over time t. The function ai(t)
represents the assigned power to user i for every tick t, in the same way the
function P (t) is the function of available power for every tick t, where the energy
is the power per unit time.
The valuation function is:
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vi(a) =
{
ai(t) if ai(t) ≤ xi(t)
xi(t) if ai(t) > xi(t)
representing the total amount of energy received by the i-th customer once the
excess energy has been discarded. According to the VCG mechanism with pivot
rule, the social choice function f : V → {0, 1} is defined as:
f(v) = arg maxa∈A
n∑
j=1
vj(a) (13)
As in the case in Section 3.2.3, we do not consider all the possible elements of
Rn, in fact A is defined as:
A =
{
a :
n∑
j=1
ai(t) ≤ P (t),∀t ∈ [0, T ]
∧ T∫
0
xi(t)dt ≤
T∫
0
ai(t)dt ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
}
(14)
The first condition on a ensures that for every t the overall consumption is not
greater than the produced power. Then, the second condition establishes that
the amount of energy provided to user i is greater or equal to his optimal amount
of requested energy. With this second constraint we want to shift the users’ con-
sumption instead of not providing power at all.
If the overall consumption x(t) =
∑n
j=1 xj(t) is not greater that the production
P (t) for every t, it means that the f(v) will choose a(t) = x(t), and there are no
pivot users so pi(v) = 0 for every user i. Consequently, the utility of user i will
be: ui(v) = ai(t).
If for some t, x(t) > P (t) the social choice function will select an outcome a
that for that t will be
∑n
j=1 aj(t) = P (t), providing less power to one or more
users but providing more power to this set of users where x(t) < P (t) in order
to satisfy the constraint:
∫ T
0
xi(t)dt ≥
∫ T
0
ai(t)dt.
This mechanism has all the properties of the mechanism in Section 3.2.4, in ad-
dition it chooses the energy to be provided according to every user’s preferences,
allowing the shifting of the consumption in the interval [0, T ].
3.2.5 Case 5 In the previous case, it can happen that there is no solution
because is not possible to shift the consumption for every user because it is not
satisfied the second constraint regarding the single consumption for each user.
So, in this new case we try to overcome this problem. Our aim is to allocate a
positive amount of power for users that have a positive consumption. To reach
this aim, we modify the set of possible outcomes A. As in the mechanism 3.2.4,
we have that a possible outcome is a = (a1(t), . . . , an(t)) where ai(t) ∈ [0, xi(t)]
for every t ∈ [0, T ] and where xi : [0, T ]→ R is the desired consumption function
of user i over time t. The allocated power function for every user i is defined as:
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ai(t) =
{ xi(t) if n∑
j=1
xj(t) ≤ P (t)
xi(t)
n∑
i=1
xi(t)
· P (t) if
n∑
j=1
xj(t) > P (t)
As payment scheme we use the Clarke pivot rule (Equation 8):
pi(v) = maxb∈A
n+1∑
j 6=i
vj(b)−
n+1∑
j 6=i
vj(f(v)) (15)
According to this allocation scheme, if the requested power is less or equal than
the production the mechanism will select the users’ desired consumption. In the
opposite case, the mechanism will allocate a power amount proportional to the
i’s desired consumption. This approach has the advantage that every user will
get a positive amount of power and no energy is wasted.
3.2.6 Case 6 We start from the mechanism described in Section 3.2.4.So,
consider a scenario with n players, we have that a possible outcome is a =
(a1(t), . . . , an(t)) where ai(t) ∈ R+ for every t ∈ [0, T ] and where xi : [0, T ]→ R
is the desired consumption function of user i over time t. The function ai(t)
represents the assigned power to user i for every tick t, in the same way the
function P (t) is the function of available power for every tick t.
The valuation function is:
vi(a) =
{
ai(t) if ai(t) ≤ xi(t)
xi(t) if ai(t) > xi(t)
According to the VCG mechanism with pivot rule, the social choice function
f : V → {0, 1} is defined as:
f(v) = arg maxa∈A
n∑
j=1
vj(a) (16)
As in the case in Section 3.2.3, we do not consider all the possible elements of
A, in fact A is defined as:
A =
{
a :
n∑
j=1
ai(t) ≤ P (t),∀t ∈ [0, T ]
∧ T∫
0
xi(t)dt ≥
T∫
0
ai(t)dt
}
(17)
The payment made by every user i is proportional to his consumption plus a
positive amount if the provided power is near the produced power function.
Formally, it is defined as:
pi(v) = ai(t) + α(y) (18)
where α : R+ → R+ and y = [∑nj aj(t) − P (t) · c]+ with c ∈ (0, 1]. The value
c is the percentage of produced power which ensures that there will not be a
blackout situation. If for a specific t we exceed this safe amount every user has to
pay an extra amount of money, because the risk of having a blackout increases.
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3.3 Further Remarks
We could sum up our problem by drawing connections with the classical knapsack
optimization problem. In Case 3.2.1, we decide to put all into the knapsack only
if the volume of the knapsack is sufficient, otherwise we do not put in anything. In
the energy case, the distributor will provide energy only if the consumption is not
greater than the available energy. In Case 3.2.2, we assume that we have a set of
object to put into the knapsack minimizing the empty space. So, the distributor
will provide energy to a subset of users. In Case 3.2.3, we assume that we have a
liquid instead of a set of objects, so we are able to fill the entire knapsack. Here
as well, the mechanism selects the consumption for a subset of users, however
there is no wasted energy. In Case 3.2.4, we introduce the time variable. So, every
energy function become a power function over time. In Case 3.2.5, we assign the
energy in a proportional way to users maintining the VCG payment scheme. In
Case 3.2.6, we apply a mechanism without the VCG payment rule, but a user
will pay according to the proximity to the produced energy threshold. A final
remark is that this model is essentially a game so players must be motivated to
play getting a positive utility. But, in our case study, energy allocation, a user
usually has to consume and, consequently, play the game for this reason he can
accept also an utility equal to zero.
4 Related Work
In the last years, the mechanism design is used to solve several kinds of prob-
lems, thanks to its ability of solving optimization issue in a distributed manner.
The application fields are various, starting from economic markets to energy effi-
ciency. In [3], a mechanism is applied to the problem of allocating resources into
wireless networks. The problem is modelled as a strategic game with a resource
pricing scheme where the prices are decided by a mechanism designer. Taking
into account prices and local preferences, wireless devices decide which action to
perform. The final aim is to maximize social welfare and energy efficiency.
Work [16] involves real users (and not machines) into the mechanism. The aim is
to select the best price for cloud services. Here, different scenarios are evaluated,
where users access the service for the same time-period and where users come
and go. This work applies the Shapley Value mechanism.
An approach close to our work from the state of art is represented by the pa-
per [12], and its related previous work [13]. In [12], the authors associate the
users’ needs with energy producers. The aim of the model is to encourage ef-
ficient energy consumption among users with a VCG mechanism that collects
private informations from users and computes the electricity bill. In this work,
users receive all the required energy because the energy provider is able to buy
energy from external sources. The main difference is that we assume that there
exists a threshold of produced energy that users cannot overcome, i.e. there
are some situations in which is not possible to buy or produce more electricity.
So, the efficiency of our model is computed through the maximization of users
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valuations. Instead, in [12] they want to maximize the users valuations while min-
imizing the total energy cost paid by the provider to the producer. In summary,
we assign the available energy to users. So, we face a resource allocation problem
instead of supply the overall requested energy at the best price. Another similar
work is reported in [1], that tries to achieve efficiency in energy consumption
with economic incentives, thanks to an indirect revelation mechanism. A survey
of residential load controlling techniques to implement demand side management
in future smart grid is presented in [15]. In that work, the authors discuss dif-
ferent energy consumption scheduling schemes to minimize energy consumption
cost and reduce peak load. They analyse several methods based on different ap-
proaches, such as scheduling, game theory or scheduling protocol trough smart
meter devices. The paper [9] presents a new energy consumption scheduling
scheme to enable Demand Side Management (DSM) in which an autonomous
energy scheduling scheme is deployed to achieve minimum consumption cost and
reduction in peak load by the use of an algorithm taking into account peak-hours
with smart meter devices. In several works, the VCG mechanism is modified to
solve allocation problems. A concrete example is described in [17], in which a
classical VCG mechanism is combined with one-dimensional surrogate valua-
tion functions. This approach provides efficient allocation for strategic buyers
at Nash equilibrium points. The work in [18] presents a pseudo-VCG mecha-
nism, based on the mechanism in [17]. In [18], the authors present a mechanism
for allocating divisible commodity, satisfying several properties as the No Envy
property. In [8], several auction mechanisms are evaluated for network resource
allocation without knowledge of the utility functions of involved actors. It deals
with maximum allocation efficiency for one or multiple indivisible items and
for divisible resources applying several auction mechanism. Considering users’
energy behaviour, every lifestyle is strictly related to energy absorption. In the
literature, several works have been published in the topic of users’ energy be-
haviour, trying to classify different user’s profile. In particular, in [6] there is
a significant study of patterns of domestic electricity consumption. This work
is based on a real analysis of different houses taking into account several pa-
rameters like: location, floor area, household, etc. This paper states that there
is a direct correlation between the amount of energy consumed and the user’s
well-being. Moreover, we assume to have the users’ consumption function.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we applied a VCG mechanism for the DSM problem. We propose
several configurations of the mechanism, starting from the simplest to a more
complicated configuration which has the property of assigning the available en-
ergy to users according to their desired energy minimizing the energy wasting
while maximizing the aggregate utility of all users. One weak point of the mech-
anisms presented is that users won’t pay according to the amount of energy
assigne to them but they pay a different amount with respect to their energy
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consumption. This fact collides with the idea behind mechanism design: stimu-
late the players by offering an advantage in playing the game. For this reason,
the player usually gets a positive utility. However, in our specific problem users
need to consume energy and consequently play the game. So, a development is to
find a different payment scheme that takes into account the actual consumption
and energy consumption peaks. The final aim is to stimulate users to behave in
a good energy way offering a discount on the electricity bill that will lead to get
a positive net utility. In a simulation context, it will be extremely useful to use
real consumption functions and a real energy availability function in order to
build a multiagent simulation system with the final aim to capture and compare
the results between standard and our proposed mechanism.
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